El presente artículo se enfrenta al problema clásico sobre cómo interpretar lo que Aristóteles, en de An. III, 5, denomina “el intelecto que produce todas las cosas”, llamado comúnmente intelecto agente. Históricamente, se han presentado dos lecturas: una, que se remonta a Alejandro de Afrodisia, que lo asocia con el motor inmóvil y con la divinidad y otra, asociada a Teofrasto pero que tiene en Filópono y St. Tomás de Aquino a sus principales representantes, que lo considera una facultad puramente (...) humana. Esta última interpretación ha sido históricamente la más sostenida; sin embargo, en tiempos recientes ha habido un resurgimiento de interpretaciones del intelecto agente como “divino”. Lo que queremos mostrar en este texto es que este resurgimiento se debe, más que a una reinterpretación del intelecto agente, a una comprensión diferente de la divinidad en la filosofía aristotélica, con características inmanentes y más próximas al intelecto humano. (shrink)

L’objectif du présent essai est de soutenir que l’horizon de la philosophie moderne est circonscrit par un dilemme inéluctable, qui gouverne toutes les instances de la raison critique depuis les Méditations métaphysiques de René Descartes. Ce dilemme est le suivant: ou bien nous assumons l’exercice du doute radical de manière à le surmonter dans une ontologie du «sujet transcendantal», et nous sommes alors confrontés à des apories insurmontables, ou bien nous outrepassons la possibilité du doute radical en adoptant pour point (...) de départ notre relation «effective» au monde, et nous sommes alors contraints d’admettre la contingence possible des structures de l’expérience – ce que nous pourrions appeler le «problème de la facticité». En ce sens, nous indiquerons comment ce dilemme détermine le passage de Descartes à Kant, puis de Husserl à Heidegger, c’est-à-dire aussi bien le «tournant critique» que ce qu’il convient d’appeler le «tournant existentiel de la phénoménologie». (shrink)

This chapter narrates in broad strokes the history of theodicy. Starting with an indication how Biblical texts have functioned in theodical thinking, it discusses the key ideas of Irenaeus (soul‐making), St. Augustine (free will), Leibniz (best of all possible worlds), Joseph Butler (imperfect comprehension of God's governance), Hegel (cunning of Reason), C.S. Lewis (God's megaphone), Ewing (principle of organic unities), Plantinga (felix culpa), and Swinburne (greater goods).

Toward the end of his famous Rule, written late in his life, near the middle of the sixth century, St. Benedict provides instructions for the selection of an abbot, the leader and spiritual "father" of the cenobitic monastic community, who is to represent Christ to the men under his charge. The beginning of Chapter 64 of RB states: In the installation of an abbot, the proper method is always to appoint the one whom the whole community agrees to choose in (...) the fear of God. Or a part of the community, no matter how small, may make the choice if they possess sounder judgment. Let the candidate be chosen for merit of life and wisdom of teaching, even if he hold the last rank in the community. But it can happen... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:René Girard and Giorgio AgambenConvergent and Divergent Political and Theological ProspectsBart Leenman (bio)INTRODUCTIONUnfortunately, categorical violence (violence wrought against a scapegoat minority, like ethnic cleansing and genocide) is a perpetual human problem. Although many thinkers concerned themselves with the issue of categorical violence, I would like to discuss René Girard (1923–2015) and Giorgio Agamben (born in 1942), two contemporary thinkers who present intriguing perspectives on categorical violence. Rather than viewing (...) violence as an external element of societal life, they discuss the societal function of categorical violence while situating a sacred victim at the heart of their theories. Girard and Agamben are an unlikely pairing. Girard is renowned for his socio-anthropological mimetic theory, while Agamben is known for his political philosophy. However, despite these different perspectives, Girard's mimetic theory and Agamben's political philosophy share some intriguing similarities. For example, both thinkers employ an archaeological (anthropogenetic) methodology and situate their [End Page 203] thoughts against the background of Judeo-Christian concepts such as messianism, revelation, and apocalypse. However, the most striking similarity is their shared focus on violence and the sacred. Rather than viewing violence as an external element of human life, Girard and Agamben discuss the societal "function" of violence while situating a sacred victim at the heart of their theories. Girard situates this sacred victim (the scapegoat) at the heart of his socio-anthropological theory of violence, mimesis, and desire. In contrast, Agamben situates his sacred victim (the homo sacer) at the heart of his political philosophy. Despite this intriguing similarity, Girard's and Agamben's political and theological prospects diverge. Even though both thinkers turn to Judeo-Christian concepts in their political and theological explorations, they interpret this Judeo-Christian context differently. Girard relates his political–theological prospects to Christian revelation. In contrast, Agamben connects his political–theological prospects to a philosophical reading of St. Paul.In this article, I compare and discuss Girard's and Agamben's perspectives on violence, their sacred victims, and the theological and political implications of their theories. I argue that Girard's and Agamben's divergent theological and political prospects can be traced to their opposing definition of their sacred victims, which, in turn, derives from a fundamentally different ontological conceptualization of the sacred. Therefore, the research question arises: "What constitutes Girard's and Agamben's opposing definition of the sacred victim and their fundamentally different conceptualization of the sacred underlying this definition, and what are the political and theological implications of this fundamentally different conceptualization of the sacred?"In order to answer this research question, I begin by discussing the basics of Girard's mimetic theory and Agamben's political philosophy. Then, I provide an overview of pertinent academic literature concerning the comparison between Girard and Agamben. This overview demonstrates the academic embeddedness of Girard and Agamben and their discussion of a sacred victim. Furthermore, it helps us to explore the apparent similarities and fundamental differences between Girard's mimetic theory and Agamben's political philosophy. Following that, I explicate the fundamental differences and argue that one could trace these differences to Girard's and Agamben's divergent ontological conceptualization of the sacred. Finally, I argue that Girard's and Agamben's divergent political and theological prospects do not obstruct a comparison between Girard and Agamben but invoke further research concerning Girard, Agamben, and the ontological conceptualization of the sacred. [End Page 204]GIRARD, AGAMBEN, AND THEIR SACRED VICTIMSIn 1961, René Girard published Deceit, Desire and the Novel. In this book, Girard introduces the principles of his mimetic theory.1 These principles derive from a careful analysis of classic European novels. Until that point, Girard occupied himself predominantly with the study of literature, arguing that the classic European novels reveal a kind of (psychological–biological) truth. This truth has everything to do with the notion of desire and how it is portrayed in classic European novels. According to Girard, the classic European novels reveal that desire is triangular rather than bilateral.2 The subject (S) desires an object (O) through a model of mediation (M).3 In other words, people desire what the other desires, and desire is not authentic but mimetic. Although desire... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Denial of PeterRené Girard, Mimetic Desire, and ConversionWilliam E. Cain (bio)Man is the creature who does not know what to desire, and he turns to others in order to make up his mind. We desire what others desire because we imitate their desires.—René GirardI believe in commitment … We must be committed to one position and follow it through.—René GirardIn many books and essays throughout his long career, (...) the literary critic and cultural theorist René Girard presented, developed, and extended provocative ideas about, and insights into, mimetic desire. Our desires are not our own, Girard emphasizes; they do not come from within. We form our desires on the desires that we perceive in others; they are our models; we imitate them. Always, we seek to be aligned with the words and deeds of an envied model or, more generally, with those of a dominant group or crowd. [End Page 101]As Girard defines it, desire is extremely potent and controlling. We cannot resist its force, and all too often it propels individuals and societies into rivalry, hatred, and violence. There are descriptions of this formidable power in Sophocles, Shakespeare, and other great writers of the Western tradition, as Girard has demonstrated. But, even more, Girard maintains that we witness the operation, that is, the revelation, of mimetic desire—its origins, its consequences—in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament.The temptation and sin of Adam and Eve, the story of Joseph and his brothers, the judgment of Solomon, the story of Job, the crucifixion of Jesus—these are some of Girard's recurring examples. However, the Biblical episode that may have mattered the most to him, one that he invoked repeatedly, is the Denial of St. Peter.The details of this story differ somewhat from one gospel to the next—Girard prefers the version of it in the gospel of Mark—but the core of it is this: At the Last Supper, Jesus predicted that Peter would deny him three times; Peter swore that he would not, but when the time of testing came, he did. When others confronted him, the fearful Peter, desiring to belong, desperate to be safely within the group, denied that he knew who Jesus was: "I do not know the man you speak of" (Mark 14:71).1Girard's explications of the Denial bring into focus his theory of mimetic desire. His reiterated point about St. Peter is really a point about us—that we are the same as this disciple: We would have betrayed Jesus too. In New Testament studies, some have claimed that "the story about Peter is simply a concretizing of the general denial of all the disciples."2 In our own times of test and trial, we have acted and will act as Peter did.Consider Girard's treatment of the Denial in Le Sacrifice (2003; English trans. 2011).3 The mob that calls for Jesus's death, Girard explains, "is constituted and nourished by swallowing up everything that passes within its reach. It is the black hole of violent mimeticism; where mimeticism is most dense, the mob emerges."4"The major example," he continues, "is that of Peter's denial":Peter cannot help but imitate their hostility. If we psychologize this denial, if we attribute it to the suggestible temperament of the apostle, we seek to prove (unconsciously) that in Peter's place, we would not have denied Jesus. It should be recalled that before his denial Peter, too, vows never to deny Jesus. He is too preoccupied with the opinion others have of him not to blindly adopt the politically correct attitude of the milieu at the center of which he has the misfortune of finding himself.5 [End Page 102] Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 1."All the actors and witnesses of the crucifixion," Girard concludes, "are already hostile to Jesus or they become so, for mimeticism spares no one."6We cannot resist the influence of the mob: Inevitably we succumb to it. No more than Peter would we have remained steadfast. There is nothing inherent in Peter as an individual that explains why he... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Earthquake of 1906, the Christian Anarchy of Dorothy Day, and the Opened “Tomb” of René GirardAnn W. Astell (bio)The autobiographical writings of Dorothy Day (1897–1980) feature a childhood memory of catastrophe and conversion, her traumatic experience at age eight of the earthquake that rocked San Francisco and Oakland in 1906, leaving half of San Francisco in ruins and sending 50,000 refugees in flight from the burning city, many (...) of them in ferries across the bay. Day’s observations of the spontaneous behavior of people who helped one another at that time of crisis guided her later in dealing with the great crash of 1929 and the subsequent economic depression, during which, in 1933, she cofounded with Peter Maurin (1877–1949) the Catholic Worker Movement and its many Houses of Hospitality.Day’s experience of an anti-sacrificial civilization of love emerging spontaneously out of a chaotic situation of social crisis seems to challenge René Girard’s theory of the scapegoat-mechanism as the normative way of restoring order and peace to a community whose very existence is threatened by anarchy. A closer examination of Day’s experience and social thought in conversation with Girard’s reveals that Girard and Day agree about the violent origins of all culture, which Day envisages as revealed by an earthquake, Girard as concealed by a tomb—related foundational images that, as we shall see, Scripture scholars [End Page 19] find collocated especially in the final chapters of the Gospel according to St. Matthew. The difference between the two images—one natural and one man-made—should not, and indeed cannot, be overlooked, however. The earthquake and its social effect as observable phenomena force the consideration that Girard’s early formulations of his theory, which explicitly distanced it from naturalistic explanations of myth, need to be revised in a way that accords more closely with his own later, apocalyptic thought.In an article published recently in Contagion, Matthew Pattillo has shown that Girard’s writings parallel, and to some extent directly affected, those of Jacques Ellul,1 the noted Christian anarchist who cites Girard explicitly on occasion and whose many books, according to Mark and Louise Zwick, “influenced the later Catholic Worker Movement.”2 In this article, I follow Pattillo’s lead, going back in time in order to examine ways in which the mimetic theory of Girard illumines the early thought and practice of Day, highlighting the originality of Day’s Christian anarchism as a remedy for a culture founded on violence. Whereas Girard posits a prereligious phase of anarchic, contagious violence, to which the rituals and prohibitions of religious societies responded (thus distantly preparing the way for a secularized modernity in which “law and order” stand opposed to an ever-threatening “anarchy”), Day finds a freely chosen Christian anarchy the best cure for anarchic destruction and totalitarianism alike, thus forging what Pattillo calls a “‘third way’ beyond law, beyond morality, beyond chaos.”3 In the end, the prolonged crisis within which the Catholic Workers shape their anarchistic “new society” against an eschatological horizon confirms Girard’s apocalypticism, even as it serves to place it in conversation with the apocalyptic philosophy of history of the Russian philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev (1874–1949), whose thought influenced Maurin and Day.4The Earthquake and the TombFor Girard, the tomb is the real and metaphoric evolutionary origin of human civilization. “Culture,” he writes,always develops as a tomb. The tomb is nothing but the first human monument to be raised over the surrogate victim, the first, most elemental and fundamental matrix of meaning. There is no culture without a tomb, and no tomb without a culture; in the end, the tomb is the first and only [End Page 20] cultural symbol. The above-ground tomb does not have to be invented. It is the pile of stones in which the victim of unanimous stoning is buried.5Moving from its literal, historical meaning in connection with a primeval murder, Girard elaborates the metaphorical significance of the tomb for culture as a whole. As a site serving two functions simultaneously—namely, those of honoring the dead and of concealing a corpse—the tomb... (shrink)

In this address to the president's plenary at the 2001 annual meeting of the Society for Social Studies of Science in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the author reflected on then recent international events and their possible implications for the research and teaching agendas of the social studies of science, technology, and medicine. He proposed the political engagement of science, technology, and society institutions and individual STS researchers while maintaining a strong commitment to the scholarly studies of science and technology. Drawing on the (...) work of René Gabriëls, the author elaborated a role for STS scholars as the new generation of “public intellectuals.”. (shrink)

À propos de : Susan Schneider, Artificial You : AI and the Future of your Mind, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2019. Susan Schneider est professeure associée au département de philosophie de l’Université du Connecticut (États-Unis). Dans cet ouvrage destiné à une large audience, Schneider affirme la nécessité de clarifier la nature des états mentaux, de la conscience et de l’identité, pour garantir le développement de formes d’intelligence artificielle et d’amélioration cognitive dési...

I have always considered that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be demonstrated by philosophical rather than ...

_TABLE OF CONTENTS:_ Translator's Introduction Introduction by Genevieve Rodis-Lewis _The Passions of the Sou_l: Preface PART I: About the Passions in General, and Incidentally about the Entire Nature of Man PART II: About the Number and Order of the Passions, and the Explanation of the Six Primitives PART III: About the Particular Passions Lexicon: Index to Lexicon Bibliography Index Index Locorum.

Contains English translations of Descartes' 1637 treatise Discourse on the Method for Conducting One's Reason Well and for Searching for Truth in the Sciences and a subsequent development of the ideas contained in it, Meditations on First Philosophy, first published in 1641. Includes a selected bibliography. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

This edition features reliable, accessible translations; useful editorial materials; and a straightforward presentation of the Objections and Replies, including the objections from Caterus, Arnauld, and Hobbes, accompanied by Descartes' replies, in their entirety. The letter serving as a reply to Gassendi--in which several of Descartes' associates present Gassendi's best arguments and Descartes' replies--conveys the highlights and important issues of their notoriously extended exchange. Roger Ariew's illuminating Introduction discusses the Meditations and the intellectual environment surrounding its reception.

Principles of Philosophy. Author’s Letter to the Translator (Preface).

Recently, an increasing number of scholars have been showing interest in old-fashioned racism again. While recent studies on old-fashioned racism apparently increase our knowledge of this psychological theory of racism, the studies actually shed light on a different type of racism, namely offensive racism. The aim of this text is to argue that psychological theories of racism, like old-fashioned racism and modern racism, depend on societies’ social norms. I will show that questionnaires are highly sensitive to social norms, and if (...) there is change in social norms, the original measurement object alters. The theory of old-fashioned racism implicitly assumes agents that follow (or conform to) the social norm to behave prejudiced. Today, however, this social norm does not exist in Western societies. If agents express the same prejudices today, they indicate their willingness to breach the social norm to behave unprejudiced. Thereby, classic old-fashioned racism measures reflect a new kind of racism today. (shrink)

10. Physico-mathematica. Compendium musicae. Regulae ad directionem ingenii. Recherche de la vérité. Supplément à la correspondance.

Which properties can we visually experience? Some authors hold that we can experience only low-level properties such as color, illumination, shape, spatial location, and motion. Others believe that we can also experience high-level properties, such as being a dog or being a pine tree. On the basis of her method of phenomenal contrast, Susanna Siegel has recently defended the latter view. One of her central claims is that we can best account for certain phenomenal contrasts if we assume that we (...) can visually experience natural kind properties. In this paper, I argue that certain kinds of low-level properties, namely shape-gestalt properties, can explain these phenomenal contrasts just as well as high-level properties. If successful, this is a modest, but nevertheless significant result. Even though it does not prove the falsity of Siegel’s proposal, it nevertheless secures the existence of a plausible alternative. (shrink)

Part I. Space and Time in the History of Philosophy. The Concept of Space in Antiquity / Max Jammer. -- Aristotle and the Sea Battle / G.E.M. Anscombe. -- Questions About Time / St. Augustine. -- Space and Matter / Renè Descartes. -- Absolute Space and Time / Isaac Newton. -- The Relational Theory of Space and Time / Gottfried Leibniz. -- Place, Extension and Duration / John Locke. -- Transcendental Ideality of Space and Time / Immanuel Kant. -- Mirror (...) Images / Immanuel Kant. -- Newton's Views of Time, Space and Motion / Ernst Mach. -- The Unreality of Space and time / F.H. Bradley. -- Duration and Intuition / Henri Bergson. -- The Problem of Infinity Considered Historically / Bertrand Russell. -- Part II. Geomoetry and Physics. What is Geometry? / A.S. Eddington. -- Space and Geometry / Ernest Nagel. -- Non-Eucledian Spaces / Hans Reichenbach. -- Geometry and Definition of Congruence / Hans Reichenbach. -- Geometry as a Branch of Physics / H.P. Robertson. -- Part III. Space-Time and Relativity. Relativity / R.E. Peierls. -- Autobiographical Notes / Albert Einstein. -- The Four-Dimensional World / Moritz Schlick. -- Space and Time / H. Minkowski. The Philosophical Retention of Absolute Space in Einstein's General Theory of relativity / Adolf Grünbaum. -- Part IV. Recent Philosophical Analyses. Ostensible Temporality / C.D. Croad. -- Time : A Treatment of Some Puzzles / J.N. Findlay. -- Time and Language, and the Passage fo Time / Nelson Goodman. -- Time / W.V. Quine. -- Geometrical Objects / W.V. Quine. -- Spatial and Temporal Ananlogies and the Concept of Identity / Richard Taylor. -- Time, Irreversible Processes, and the Physical Status of Becoming / Adolf Grünbaum. (shrink)

A concise summary of Nicanor’s theory of punctuation that has recently been discovered in a codex mixtus of the 15th century throws precious new light on a topic of some complexity. The general picture that emerges from the new extract does not substantially differ from that of the other known summary, which has been the starting point for all modern reconstructions of Nicanor’s theory. Therefore, these reconstructions need not be rewritten on a larger scale. The two summaries nevertheless display some (...) telling differences in how they explain and present the details, not least when read against the backdrop of Nicanor’s actual practice that can be derived from the relevant scholia to Homer. The purpose of the present article is to assess the new discovery especially with regard to these differences and their effects on how Nicanor’s theory is to be reconstructed. (shrink)

According to the standard view on the issue, the habit of marking questions with a particular typographical sign in Greek and Latin script does not arise prior to the eighth or ninth century. This period is generally credited with the ‘invention’ of the question mark (excepting Syriac evidence, which points to the fifth and sixth centuries). The purpose of the present article is to correct this view. It argues that the first indication for the use of a typographical sign that (...) marks questions can actually be detected no later than during the reign of Emperor Hadrian (a.d. 117–38), that is, more than half a millennium before the traditional date of the invention. The chief witness is Nicanor of Alexandria, who does not seem to have used question marks himself, but criticizes the misappropriation of another punctuation mark to that purpose. He thus indirectly testifies to the existence of question marks. Comparable traces can also be found later in the exegetical works of some Christian commentators. (shrink)

Attempts to interpret the manifold aspects of the ternary heaven, earth and man, drawing mainly on Far-Eastern sources. This study aims to demonstrate the metaphysical, cosmological and spiritual perspectives underlying the Triad symbol.

Rationality and reason are often used as synonyms, although they are very different concepts. In this article we argue that rationality is the concept of reason that has been stripped of its human elements. Ancient and medieval philosophers such as Aristotle and Aquinas stressed that the concept of reason is composed of sensitive, discursive, and moral elements. Post-Enlightenment thinkers instead, building on the works of René Descartes and Isaac Newton, took these out and claimed that rationality must be based on (...) an external logic devoid of value-concepts such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim (Koyré in From the closed world to the infinite universe, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1957). The purpose of this essay is to highlight this shift in Western thought and its consequences for management theories. While explaining the ancient concept of reason in contrast with modern rationalism (Klein in: Williamson RB, Zuckerman E (eds) Jacob Klein—lectures and essays, St. John’s College Press, Annapolis, 1985), we aim at raising awareness of the differences between building a research programme (especially in business sciences like economics and management) on rationality or on reason. (shrink)

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed (...) player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)

For example, Descartes' attempt to define the role of God in man's cognitive fallibility is a reiteration of an old argument that points out the incongruity between the existence of God and evil, and his pivotal question "whence error?" is shown here to be a rephrasing of the question "whence evil?" The answer Descartes gives in the Meditations is actually a reformulation of the answer found in St. Augustine's De Libero Arbitrio and the Confessions.

This study is the first work ever to interpret the Meditations as theodicy. I show that Descartes' attempt to define the role of God for man's cognitive fallibility in so far as God is the creator of man's nature, is a reiteration of an old Epicurean argument pointing out the incongruity between the existence of God and evil. The question of the nature and origin of error which Descartes addresses in the First Meditation is reformulated in the Fourth Meditation into (...) broader considerations about the nature and scope of human freedom. ;The point of gravity of my thesis is Descartes' conceptions of human freedom and divine liberty. Since the conception of human freedom is the reversal of the doctrine of divine liberty, I analyze the two conceptions as two sides of the same problem--the problem of man's relation to God, or the problem of the relation of finitude to Infinity. I show that Descartes' quest for Certitude--which runs parallel to his attempt to overcome the problem of an evil deity--can be reformulated into the problem of creation. I present the problem of error as the problem of evil, and the problem of human will I present as the problem of human freedom, and the search for Certitude I interpret as the vindication of God's goodness and omnipotence, that is, theodicy. ;There are several points which are essential for Cartesian metaphysics, and which, as I demonstrate, Descartes borrowed from St. Augustine: the doctrine of the eternal truths , the conception of human freedom, the theory of error and the explanation of the will's propensity towards error , and the account of human nature. It is my contention that as much as Descartes insisted on the timelessness of his philosophy, what he had to say on the relationship between God and man is a reflection of the 17th c. theological debates which were fought by the Augustinians and the Molinists and were expressed by Descartes in the language and categories created by St. Augustine. (shrink)

It is a common assumption among philosophers of perception that phenomenal colors are exhaustively characterized by the three phenomenal dimensions of the color solid: hue, saturation and lightness. The hue of a color is its redness, blueness or yellowness, etc. The saturation of a color refers to the strength of its hue in relation to gray. The lightness of a color determines its relation to black and white. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenology of shadows forces us to (...) consider illumination as an additional dimension of phenomenal colors. For this purpose, I will first introduce two different interpretations of shadow-experiences, which Chalmers has called the simple and the complex interpretations, and show that they both fail to account for important phenomenal facts about shadow-experiences. I will then introduce my own alternative interpretation based on the idea that illumination is a dimension of phenomenal colors and explain how it can account for these facts. (shrink)

Promoting student’s school engagement is a major goal in our society. The literature has shown that students’ proximal sources of social support can play a fundamental role in facilitating this engagement. The purpose of this study was to compare perceived support from four sources as a function of two different middle-school student backgrounds, a priority education area and a privileged area; and to examine the contribution of these main sources of social support, either directly or indirectly to school engagement; and (...) to test whether perceived social support is more strongly related to school engagement, directly or indirectly, among students from priority education school compared to students from the advantaged area. In all, 623 middle-school students from either a privileged or priority education area participated in this study. The results showed that the mother was perceived as providing more support, followed by the father, the teachers, and the peers. Students from the priority education area perceived more support from their teachers than their counterparts from the more privileged area did. A path analysis showed that each source of social support, except for maternal support, contributed to school engagement. Peers and teachers emerged as the best source of support for school engagement, having significant direct effects among students from the priority education area and both direct and indirect effects among students from the advantaged area. Peer support also appears to have a double-edged effect on school engagement among students in the priority education area. This study contributes to enlightening the phenomenon of school engagement in adolescence by clarifying the role of social support and the related mediating process. Being perceived as an important source of social support by students is not enough to contribute to their sense of school belonging and school engagement. (shrink)

Paintings can exert a strong effect on their viewers by creating atmospheres. But how is it possible for a painting to create an atmosphere? My goal in this paper is to provide a partial answer to this question by focusing on the depiction of light. I argue that paintings can elicit experiences of atmospheres in part because they can depict pictorial space as filled with ambient light that has a distinctive phenomenal character. It is in virtue of this distinctive phenomenal (...) character that the depicted ambient light can make a significant contribution to the overall phenomenal character of the experienced atmosphere. (shrink)

Quels sont les liens entre phantasia et perception? Aristote a bien découvert en la première, rattachée à la seconde, la faculté de se représenter en l'absence. Il y a certes des cas de représentation en présence imputés à la phantasia, mais cet emploi du terme, qui renvoie à des situations infraperceptives, est plutôt résiduel. Ces cas pathologiques sont pour Aristote assez peu dignes d'intérêt. On ne peut dire que la phantasia « interprète ». What is the link between phantasia and (...) perception? Although it depends on aisthêsis itself, Aristotle calls phantasia a faculty of representing in absentia, of which he is the discoverer. Of course, some cases of representation in praesentia are attributed to phantasia, but this use of the word is not central; these cases are cases below perception proper, and pathology of perception is of minor interest in Aristotle's mind. Phantasia is not an interpretation of the data. (shrink)

This article is a discussion of Hume's maxim Nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. First I explain this maxim and distinguish it from the principle Whatever cannot be imagined (conceived), is impossible. Next I argue that Thomas Reid's criticism of the maxim fails and that the arguments by Tamar Szábo Gendler and John Hawthorne for the claim that “it is uncontroversial that there are cases where we are misled” by the maxim are unconvincing. Finally I state the limited but real (...) value of the maxim: it does help us, in certain cases, reliably to make up our minds. Along the way I show that Reid, his criticism of the maxim notwithstanding, actually employs it, and I furthermore argue that the principle What is inconceivable, is impossible is spurious. (shrink)